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[L. A. No. 29354. In Bank.

Apr. 19, 1967.]

P. S. 0 'REILLY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF
MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.
[la, Ib] Oonstitutional Law-Due Process--Pursuance of Occupation: Physicians-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Review.-Assessment by the state medical board of a penalty
for a doctor's unprofessional conduct on the basis of proceedings initiated before the osteopathic board was not a
denial of due process where, after the doctor elected to cease
being licensed by the osteopathic board and to become licensed
by the medical board, the matter was transferred to the
medical board and it ratified prior actions of the osteopathic
board, which fully complied with the required procedures in
Gov. Code, §§ 11503, 11505, 11509.
[2] IeL-Due Process of Law.-Due process is not interested in
mere technical formalism; substance determines whether due
process was afforded.
[3] Physicians-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Statutory Provisions.-A state law incompatible with federal law
cannot be enforced, and in determining the right of the state
medical board to discipline a doctor for employment of doctors
unlicensed in this state to treat the sick pursuant to the federal exchange-visitor program (62 Stat. 6), the controlling
question is whether Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2392, making it unprofessional conduct to employ an unlicensed practitioner to
treat the sick, is incompatible with the federal program.

MeK. Dig. References: [1] Constitutional Law, §176; Physicians and Surgeons, § 30; [2] Constitutional Law, § 169 (1); [3]
Physicians and Surgeons, § 17; [4] Physicians and Surgeons,
§ 4(1); [5] Physicians and Surgeons, § 28(4); [6, 7] Physicians
and Surgeons, § 30.
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[4] Id.-Statutes and Regulations-Validity.-Though to comply
with state Jaw, a foreign visitor must either refrain from
practicing medicine or comply with burdensome state regulations, the federal statute establishing the exchange-visitor program (62 Sbt. 6, now repeaJed and consolidated with other
programs under 22 U.S.C. § 2451 et seq.) does not supersede
state regulations; the federal program does not provide effective patient protection, and since Congress has the power to
regulate the practice of medicine, even though the power is
ordinarily committed to the states, it cannot be assumed that
in establishing the exchange program, Congress intended to
deprive patients of the protection of state regulation.
[6] Id.-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Evidence.-In a
disciplinary proceeding concerning a doctor's alleged employment of an unlicensed practitioner to treat the sick in violation
of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2392, a conclusion that an unlicensed
doctor had diagnosed and treated a patient and had been
empioyed to do so was justified by evidence that the unlicensed
doctor performed medical functions and administered treatments to the patient and that the ac~used, who had employed
the unlicensed doctor pursuant to the federal exchange program, had never seen the patient; consultations with the-accused did not make the unlicensed doctor's action lawful.
[6] Id.-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Review.-In a
p~o~eeding to discipline a doctor for a violation of Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 2392, making it unprofessional conduct to employ
an unlicensed practitioner to treat the sick, though good faith
is not a defense, any punishment greater than probation was
precluded for a violation of § 2392 by the violator's apparent
good faith in allowing foreign .doctors to assist him pursuant
to the federal exchange-visitor program and by the uncertainty
surrounding the question of federal pre-emption of state regulations.
Id.-Suspension
and Revocation of License-Review.-Where
[7]
a single penalty was imposed for two violations of Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 2392, by a doctor's employment of unlicensed practitioners to care for the sick and it did not appear on appeal
to what extent the medical board had relied on one violation
for which the imposed penalty was too severe, the case must
be remanded to the board for reconsideration of the penalty
assessed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William E. MacFaden, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Physicians and Surgeons, § 36; Am.Jur.,
Physicians and Surgeons (1st ed § 53).
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Proceeding in mandamus to set aside an order suspending a
physician's license. JudgInent denying writ reversed with
directions.
Kirtland & Packard, Richard L. Kirtland, Walter N. Anderson and Ellis J. Horvitz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
,,.

Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
Stephen H. Silver and Conrad Lee Klein, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Defendant and Respondent.

(J

TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff P. S. O'Reilly appeals from a
judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate to set
aside an order of the Board of Medical Examiners.
On September 12, 1962, an accusation was filed with the
Board of Osteopathic Examiners charging plaintiff with two
violations of Business and Professions Code section 2392.1 A
hearing officer from the Office of Administrative Procedure
held hearings on October 10 and December 20, 1962, and on
March 11, 1963, filed a proposed decision finding cause for
disciplinary action under section 2392. He recommended that
plaintiff's license be revoked but that execution be stayed on
the condition that plaintiff be placed on probation for five
years and suspended from practice for 90 days. While the
proceeding was pending plaintiff elected to become a licentiate
of the Board of Medical Examiners (see Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 2396) and that board renewed his physician's and surgeon's certificate on January 18, 1963. Thereafter, on January 22, 1964, tIle Board of Medical Examiners ratified the
proceedings before the Board of Osteopathic Examiners and
adopted the decision of the hearing officer.
Plaintiff then sought review of the board's order in the
superior court. The court found that the proceedings of the
medical board were within its jurisdiction, that the board's
decision was supported by its findings, that the findings were
supported by the weight of competent evidence, and that the
penalty imposed was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly,
it denied relief.
lSection 2392 provides: "The employing, directly or indirectly, of any
suspended or unlicensed practitioner in the practice of any system or
mode of treating the sick or afflicted or the aiding or abetting of any
unlicensed person to practice any system or mode of treating the sick or
aftlicted constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this
chapter." All further statutory citations are to the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise specified.
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[1a] We note at the outset that there is no merit in plaintiff's contention that he was denied due process when the
medical board assessed the penalty against him on the basis of
proceedings initiated before the osteopathic board. The matter
was transferred to the Board of Medical Examiners after
plaintiff had elected to cease being licensed by the osteopathic
board and to become a licentiate of the medical board.
[2] "[D] ue process is not interested in mere technical
formalism. It is the substance that is determinative of whether
due process has been afforded." (Cooper v. State Board 01
Medical Examiners, 35 Ca1.2d 242, 245 [217 P.2d 630, 18
A.L.R.2d 593].) [1b] The medical board ratified the prior
actions of the osteopathic board, which complied fully with
the procedures set forth in Government Code sections 11503,
11505 and 11509. 2 Plaintiff was not injured by the transfer.
To refile the accusation would have been an idle act, and to
require the hearing officer to rehear the case would have been
.
needlessly wasteful.
The first charge of unprofessional conduct concerned plaintiff's employment of Dr. Daniel Sanchez and Dr. Morimitsu
Ohnishi, who were not licensed to practice medicine in California. Dr. Sanchez is a citizen of Mexico and received his
medical degree there. Dr. Ohnishi is a citizen of Japan, where
he received his medical degree and is a professor of medicine.
Both doctors came to the United States under an exchangevisitor program, authorized by the United States Informationand Educational Exchange Act of 1948, to serve as trainees in
general and traumatic surgery. The Department of State had
designated plaintiif's California Emergency Hospital as an
exchange-visitor program to provide training in general and
. traumatic surgery for qualified foreign medical students and
had appointed plaintiif as the responsible officer of the program. The parties stipulated that on August 21, 1959, plaintiff
aided and abetted Dr. Ohnishi in giving anesthetics to a
patient and aided and abetted Dr. Sanchez in assisting in surgery upon the patient. From the foregoing facts the board
concluded that plaintiif violated section 2392 by employing
and aiding and abetting Dr. Ohnishi and Dr. Sanchez in the
unlicensed practice of medicine.
2Section 11503 requires the :filing of an accusation specifying the
statutes that have been violated and the facts that constitute the violation. Section 11505 requires that the respondent be served with the accusation and be notified of his rights to a hearing. Section 11509 requires
notice to the respondent of the time and place of the hearin".
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Plaintiff contends that the board cannot discipline him for
these activities, since they were undertaken pursuant to the
federal exchange-visitor program. He asserts that the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl. 2)
precludes enforcement of the state licensing laws in this case,
on the ground that such enforcement would interfere with the
federal exchange program. 'Ve do not agree with plaintiff's
contention.
[3] Since a state law that is incompatible with federal law
cannot be enforced (United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230232 [86 L.Ed. 796, 817-819, 62 8.Ct. 552]; United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-332 [81 L.Ed. 1134, 1139-1140, 57
8.Ct. 758]), the controlling question is whether section 2392 is
incompatible with the federal program.
The exchange-visitor program was established by the United
States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948
(62 Stat. 6).' Congress declared its purpose to be "to promote a better understanding of the United States in other
countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the
people of the United States and the people of other countries" by, among other things, establishing an interchange of
persons, knowledge and skill. (See 62 Stat. 6, § 2.) The Secretary of State was authorized to provide for the interchange
between the United States and other countries of students,
trainees, teachers, guest instructors, professors, and leaders in
fields of specialized knowledge or skill. (See 62 Stat. 7, § 201.)
The Secretary was directed to use "existing reputable agencies, " preferably private rather than governmental, in setting up the program for foreign visitors. (See 62 Stat. 7, 14,
§§ 201, 1005.) In addition he was empowered to prescribe and
enforce the conditions under which the foreign visitors were
to be admitted to this country. (See 62 Stat. 7, § 201.)
Pursuant to this delegation of authority, the Secretary established different classes of exchange-visitor programs, including programs sponsored by hospitals and related institutions. (See 22 C.F.R. § 63.3 (c) (1).) Under the regulations
those who wish to sponsor a program must apply to the Secretary for approval, and in reviewing the application the Secretary considers professional organizations' appraisal of the
quality of a particular program. (See 22 C.F.R. §§ 63.2(a),
8This statute was repealed by Public Law 87-256, § 111 (a) (2), 75
Stat. 538 (1961) and the program was consolidated with other similar
programs by Public Law 87-256, 75 Stat. 527-38 (1961), 22 U.S.C.
It 2451-58 (1964).
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63.3(a).) The Secretary also can revoke the approval for sufficient cause including failure to maintain educational standards established by competent professional agencies. (See 22
C.F.R. § 63.3 (b).) Once approved, the sponsor has the primary responsibility for recruiting exchange visitors and must
provide them with a form specifying the purpose, direction
and condition of the visit. (See 22 C.F.R. § 63.4.) This form
enables the visitor to obtain his visa from the American consul
in his native country.
Dr. O'Reilly applied for approval as a sponsor of an exchange-visitor program and in support of his application filed
letters from the American College of Osteopathic Surgeons
and the American Osteopathic Association attesting to the
nature and quality of his hospital program. The Secretary
designated plaintiff as a sponsor of a program to provide
training" in general and traumatic surgery for qualified foreign medical students and a three-year course in clinical
laboratory for qualified foreign studentB. Thereafter, plaintiff
recruited Drs. Ohnishi and Sanchez to participate in his program as trainees in traumatic and reconstructive surgery with
special emphasis in reconstruction of the hand and forearm.
There can be no question that to conduct the exchange
program in compliance with the state medical regula~ion
would frustrate to some extent the program's foreign policy objectives. Effective practical training in general and
traumatic surgery requires some treatment of patientB. (See
§§ 2147, 2147.5, which authorize undergraduate and postgraduate medical students to perform medical functions in
the course of their study.) Such treatment would be permissible if the foreign doctor were licensed in California (see
§ 2193) or if the program were conducted under the auspices
of an approved medical school in compliance with the detailed-requirementB of sections 2147.5 and 2147.6. Either of these
alternatives, however, would impose burdens on the foreign
visitors that might be out of proportion to the benefits that
they could expect to receive under the limited exchange programs contemplated under the federal statute. Either alternative would also expose the foreign visitor to rejection by the
state board for various reasons. [4] Although it thus appears that to comply with state law a foreign visitor must
either refrain from practicing medicine or comply with burdensome state regulations, we do not believe that the federal
statute supersedes state regulation.
The basic problem is one of accommodating the foreign pol:I
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icy objectives of the exchange programs with the interests of
the patients who might be treated by the visiting doctors.
Congress has the power to make this accommodation even
though the power to regulate the practice of medicine is ordinarily committed to the states. (Linder v. United States, 268
U.S. 5, 18 [69 L.Ed. 819, 823,45 8.Ct. 446, 39 A.L.R. 229] ; cf.
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 385' [10 L.Ed.2d 428, 432,
433, 83 8.Ct. 1322].) It cannot be lightly assumed, however,
that in establishing the exchange program, Congress intended
to deprive patients of the protection of state regulation. Had
it so intended, we are convinced that it would have provided
an effective alternative to protect patients of visiting doctors.
The federal program does not provide effective patient protection. A prospective sponsor need only secure summary recommendation from professional groups (see 22 C.F.R. § 633
(a)), and the selection of the visitors is controlled largely by
the sponsors, not the federal authorities. Finally we note that
our conclusion that state regulation is not superseded is supported by the only administrative interpretation we have been
able to find."
Plaintiff also contends that under state law the federal enactment is a statutory basis for an implied exception to the
state regulations pursuant to which the visitors could lawfully
perform medical acts. He invokes Magit v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 57 Ca1.2d 74 [17 Cal.Rptr. 488, 366 P.2d 816], in
which we recognized that with a statutory basis for an excep··
tion, persons not licensed to practice medicine may perform
some medical acts. The reasoning of the Magit case, however,
was based on the interrelationship of the state licensing provisions applicable to doctors and nurses, and there is nothin~
in that case or in the legislative scheme to support an exception to the prohibition of unlicensed practice based on a federal rather than a state statute.
411 In approving any partieular exehange program, I assume, as the
responsible offieer of the Department of State, that the sponsor will be
aware of and eomply with the applieable federal, state and loeal laws."
(Letter from Culver E. Gidden, Chief, Faeilitative Serviees Staff, Bureau
of Edueational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, to Warren H.
Deering, Deputy Attorney General, Deeember 11, 1964.) Plaintiff contends that the word " applicable" in this letter begs the basic question,
namely, what laws are applieable' Since the letter was written in response
to an inquiry from the Attorney General about the applieability of state
law to plaintiff's exchange program, we doubt that Mr. Gidden meant to
avoid the inquiry by begging the question. We believe he meant that
federal, state, and loeal laws that would ordinarily apply remained applieable to the sponsor of any exchange program.
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The second charge of unprofessional conduct involves plaintiff's employment of 'Villiam Thomas Duffy, who was a graduate of the California College of Medicine but was not licensed to practice medicine in California. Mrs. Beatric('
Gowdy te~tified that Duffy diagnosed an injury to her knee
and treated it on several occasions at plaintiff's hospital. On
no occasion had plaintiff examined her or been present while
she was being treated. Plaintiff testified, however, that he
had examined Mrs. Gowdy on several of her visits and had
made the diagnosis and that Duffy had consulted him before
administering each treatment.
The board found that plaintiff employed Duffy and that
Duffy practiced "a system of treatment in the diagnosis and
treating. of one Beatrice Gowdy." It further found that
Duffy consulted with plaintiff before applying diathermy and
other treatment and that plaintiff was not present during the
treatments.
[5] Plaintiff contends that the evidence and findings do
not support the conclusion that he employed Duffy to practice
medicine. There is, however, substantial evidence to the contrary. In administering the treatments to Mrs. Gowdy, Duffy
performed medical functions and his consultations with plaintiff did not make his actions lawfuI. Although section 2665,
subdivision (a), allows! a full time assistant to adminis~er
physical therapy under' a licensed person's "orders, directions and supervision," there is no evidence that plaintiff
attempted to provide the supervision required by this section.
In addition, Mrs. Gowdy testified that plaintiff had never seen
her. These facts justify the conclusion that Duffy had diagnosed and treated Mrs. Gowdy and that he was employed to
do so.
Finally, plaintiff contends that even if the charges are sustained by the evidence, the punishment is excessive. [6] Although good faith is not a defense (see Magif v. Board 01
Medical Examiners, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 74), we believe that the
uncertainty surrounding the question of federal pre-emption
and plaintiff's apparent good faith in allowing the foreign
doctors to assist him preclude any punishment greater than
probation for the violation involving the exchange program.
(See Magit v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra; Harrisv;--Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 62 Ca1.2d 589, 594-595
r43 Cal.Rptr. 633, 400 P.2d 745] ; Brown v. Gordon, 240 Cal.
App.2d 659, 666~667 [49 Cal. Rptr. 901]; cf. Hildebrand v.
State Bar, 36 Ca1.2d 504, 514 [225 P.2d 508].)
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[7] Since a single penalty was imposed for both violations
we have no way of knowing the extent to which the board
relied upon the first violation in imposing the 90-day suspension. Accordingly, the case must be remanded to the board for
reconsideration of the penalty assessed. (See Cooper v. State
Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Ca1.2d 242, 252 [217 P.2d
630, 18 A.L.R.2d 593]; Garfield v. Board of Medical Examiners, 99 Cal.App.2d 219, 231-232 [221 P.2d 705].)
The judgment is reversed, and the trial court is directed to
enter judgment ordering respondent board to set aside its
order of revocation and to reconsider the penalty in the light
of this opinion.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J., and White,
J.,. concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Kingsley in the opinion
prepared by him for the Court of Appeal in O'Reilly v.
Board of Med1:cal Examiners (Cal.App.) 55 Ca1.Rptr. 152.
i

Appellant's petition for a rellearing was denied May 17,
1967. White, J.,. sat in place of Mosk, J., who deemed himself
disqualified. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.
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*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicia] Council.

